Hello all. I guess I have the distinct pleasure of offering up the first review/critique of the first pro-sem reading, that of George Stocking, Jr.'s. Obviously, the first question we have to ask is "why was this essay assigned reading?" The answer, I think, is to give us not only an introductory methodological analysis of the history of anthropology, a tool set if you will for viewing the early anthropological writings that we will be tackling, but also the historical biases that we, as anthropologists, bring to our research. In that regard, Stocking argues that there are two oppositional, and yet ultimately complementary, approaches to the history of the behavioral sciences (which I take to mean anthropology, sociology, cultural psychology, etc.): "presentism" and "historicism."
Stocking begins by telling us that history is an undisciplined discipline, without a clear consensus as to motive for research or methodology. Stocking's stated project in this essay, therefore, is to define these competing viewpoints, "presentism" and "historicism" and to argue their relative merits. Basically, Stocking divides historical inquiry into two perspectives: "to understand the past for the sake of the past" and "to understand the past for the sake of the future" (and primarily, the present). Stocking points out that what I would call the discourse of modernization or development seeks to view history through the lens of the present. In other words, history is simply a series of events that inevitably prefigured our present, and by analyzing this history we can make predictions about the future. Clearly, by using the present as a referent the past is interpreted only as to what contributions it made to the present. We have all heard the saying that history is written by the "winners," which is essentially what I think Stocking is saying here. Contemporary regimes of power use the past as validation for present public policies, and also as an explanation for why those policies are necessary. This is the discourse of development, summed up well in Modernization Theory, which is in my opinion a poor argument for the adoption of capitalism. The interpretive mode of this "presentism" as Stocking puts it, is based in "justice," not in "understanding." At Chicago, we called this perspective "Historical Narrative" and highlighted the emphasis in this approach in looking for historical agents of change rather than the historical processes that led to that change. Following from Butterfield, Stocking calls this "Whiggish history" or "presentism."
The alternative approach in Stocking's dualistic model is "historicism," which seems to be the study of historical events, people, and processes within their contemporary historical context. As Stocking elaborates, the historicist tries to understand history not from a position of present-day "reasonableness" but rather from a position that takes into account the contemporary "rationality" of historical context. In other words, rather than judging the past in terms of the present, one is analyzing the past in terms of the past. (Incidentally, this is the very reason that I love Achebe's "Things Fall Apart" simply because it presents an alternative "rationality" to my own, and in a way that reveals the logic and rigor (to shamelessly rob from Althusser) of that "reasonableness.") "Understanding," Stocking argues, is an attempt to get at the "reasonableness" of what might be considered "irrational" in the present.
How does this all fit into the history of the behavioral sciences? Well, Stocking says that a historian of the behavioral sciences will be "historicist" in her or his methodology, and "affective" in motivation. This is not to ignore the inherent bias that contemporary historians have when writing about history, but it is an ideal-type of methodology and motive to adopt. Behavioral scientists, on the other hand, are "presentist" in their approach, and their motives are "utilitarian." History, in other words, is useful for inspiring and guiding work in the present. Finally, there is a discussion of Thomas Kuhn (who, along with Hilary Putnam, is arguably one of the greatest philosophers of science of the 20th century), and eventually the assertion that "presentism" has its usefulness as a measuring stick against which to judge the "historicist" approach, but on the other hand many "historicist" questions have yet to be answered by "presentists" (case in point: Ann Stoler's argument that we can't talk about "post-colonialism" until we understand truly what "colonialism" was). Well, that's my reading of it at least. Any objections, amplifications, or outright propositions to battle are all welcome!
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http://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=aOP43AlmLP8C&oi=fnd&pg=PR11&ots=1w-sNhje81&sig=AQYHBe94P9o1MDFa0oxXpl0BWqU#PPA1,M1
Here's Google Scholar's link to the reading, if anyone needs it. Great read, Stephen!
Thanks, Stephen! A helpful overview of a helpful text.
A particular point of interest to me (and quite possibly a boring digression for everyone else): assuming everyone agrees that anthropology is still in the "pre-paradigmatic" state that Stocking found it in the 1960s, do we see that primarily as a problem, or primarily as an opportunity?
I've often felt that anthropologists are a little too sanguine about the lack of clear standards for truth in our discipline--standards that might be easily related to those outside the discipline—so I was interested in how Stocking approached the question.
Taylor may have noticed that I'm partially retreading a discussion I had with him at the open weekend about Marilyn Strathern's 2004 Huxley lecture on interdisciplinarity (you can actually watch her give the paper over at Alan Macfarlane's website if you like). She is skeptical about the possiblity of translating easily between "managerial" and "research" modes of knowledge production: the former, she says, is concerned with closing off uncertainty and establishing final statements of fact (and recommendations for policy), while the latter thrives on creating uncertainty (and therefore further opportunities for research).
These two modes appear to map fairly well onto Stocking's presentism/historicism dichotomy. It may well be then, that his prescription for making the best of anthropology's pre-paradigmatic state--adopting a judiciously historicist approach to disciplinary history in the service of a judicious presentism--is still going to be helpful for us today as a model for how best to pursue anthropological research.
I'm not quite sure how this would work, of course. What do you all say?
Mark,
I think you raise a great question about the suggested parameters of anthropology, which serve to establish the foundation for the types of anthropologists we could (or should) strive to be. Unfortunately, for my own livelihood, I am forced to explore the field's interdisciplinary potential, even though I would argue that most fields of study, from philosophy to physics, all find ways to interact with one another. It helps me sleep at night, I guess.
To address these issues of historicism and presentism specifically, I am at an impasse. Perhaps it's safe for now, as you said, to consider both approaches judiciously and run with the one that we can make a stronger case for. We may never be able to resolve the limits of these analyses, but we don't really have much else at our disposal.
Or do we?
I guess I would have to fall down on the side of a "pre-paradigmatic" Anthropology, or at least one that switches paradigms every few years (or months), as an opening for more opportunity. One of the things that attracted me to Anthro in the first place was how self-critical and innovative the field is. Of course, in my own research, developing new ethnographic methods and social theories to deal with the question of online communities is necessary. However, as Elizabeth Keating cautioned me, there is always the danger of "ignoring" so-called established methodologies in favor of the solipsistic turn that ethnographers took in the 80s especially. Certainly, there must be some rigor to our discipline if our research is to be taken seriously, but continuous innovation is what makes Anthro so fun for me.
Thanks, guys. I should clarify that I don't think there's anything wrong with interdisciplinarity--I just worry about well anthropologists are able to do it. Of course, I routinely read things that suggest that my worries are ill-founded, and as Lee says, other people seem to manage to have interdisciplinary conversations all the time.
And yes, I suppose the fun is in balancing the needs of the two approaches--and in exploring the resulting uncertainty. Society keeps on changing, so why not anthropology, too?
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